Gouvenor Morris (left) and Robert Morris (right), portrait by
Charles Willson Peale, 1783
In the spring of 1783, the Continental army was stationed at Newburgh, NY, keeping an eye on the British who still occupied New York City. The shooting war had ended in October of 1781 with the surrender of General Cornwallis and his army at Yorktown Heights, Virginia. Peace treaty negotiations were proceeding slowly at Paris. A message took six weeks to cross the Atlantic, and many messages were lost at sea. France, a participant in the negotiations, had its own agenda. The Continental currency was rapidly declining in value.
The United States had entered a new, but still perilous period. The main cable that tied the States together, Britain as a common enemy, was gone. Some feared America would evolve like Europe, as a collection of sovereign states, geographically bunched up against each other. The Articles of Confederation, which created the Congress, were deeply flawed from the point of view of the Centralists: James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, Robert Morris, and many others who wanted a strong central government. The Congress was weak and ineffectual. Almost all the power resided in the States. Although Congress had the responsibility to maintain the army, it had no power to raise money. Congress could only ask the states to pay, but had no power to force them. All the money and taxing power resided in the states. Although the states had grudgingly agreed to a Confederation, they wanted a weak Congress. Having just eliminated one far away oppressor, the States were in no mood to establish another, even though closer by. In effect, they were 13 separate sovereign countries tied together by a weak Congress.
Robert Morris, Superintendent of Finance (forerunner to Secretary of the Treasury), stopped paying the Continental soldiers in the spring of 1782. There were no funds to pay them, and the States would not pay. Congress was $6 million in debt.
In the fall of 1782, Morris begged the three holdout governors of Massachusetts, Maryland, and Rhode Island to vote for an import tax to allow Congress to raise funds. Morris said: “Let me repeat that the hope of our Enemy is the derangement of our Finances, and let me add, that when revenue is given, that hope must cease.”[1] This proposed import tax, however, was defeated in Congress in November, 1782. David Howell of Rhode Island led the movement which doomed the measure to failure.
In December, senior officers and soldiers petitioned Congress to try to get funding for the army restored. A letter, drafted by senior army officers including Major General Henry Knox, was circulated in Congress. Henry Knox, one of Washington’s most trusted Generals, was no mutineer. He lent much creditability to the petition and letter. When later asked about Congress’ neglect of the troops and what might be the army’s reaction, Knox acknowledged the limits of the Continental Army, describing it as: “… a very sharp point which I hope in God will never be directed than against the Enemies of the liberties of America.”[2]
The letter asked for a lump sum payment and back pay instead of the lifetime payment the Congress had judged too expensive. The letter also included a threat: “Any further experiments on the Army’s patience may have fatal effects.”[3] Further, George Washington, himself, said at the time: “The Army is a dangerous instrument to play with.”[4]
In February 1783, many in the army became increasingly unhappy. Hamilton urged George Washington to come out in support of the army. Washington said at the time: “To me…it is clearly my opinion, unless Congress have powers competent to all general purposes, that the distresses we have encountered, the expences we have incurred, and the blood we have spilt in the course of an Eight years war, will avail us nothing.”[5] Washington, who had the utmost respect for civilian authority, urged patience.
In March 1783 an anonymous letter circulated in the army calling for a mutiny. It urged that if they were not paid, the soldiers should either leave the colonies and go west, or take up arms against the Congress and gain their rightful pay by force. A meeting was set by the conspirators, but George Washington got wind of it. He rescheduled the meeting for March 15th and implied that he would not attend. The conspirators, apparently led by Major General Horatio Gates, a long time Washington detractor, took heart. To everyone’s surprise, however, Washington did attend, and Gates ceded the floor to Washington. Washington delivered a stirring and memorable address to his officers that day, restoring calm among the disheartened troops.
Washington’s eloquent Newburgh Address circulated widely. Shortly, afterwards, on March 19th, 1783, Congress voted to enact a pension of five years full pay for the Continental soldiers. Washington’s masterful handling of this mutinous plot, diffused a potential disaster. He securely planted in the new and evolving American form of government, the idea of civilian control of the military and the desirability of a republican form of government.
Epilogue
Despite Washington’s persuading the soldiers to remain patient, in June, 1783, some army units did mutiny in Philadelphia and demand their pay. Congress, which had been in-session there, was insulted. Hoping to call attention to Congress’ ineffectual condition, the congressmen abruptly left Philadelphia and resumed their session in Princeton New Jersey.
[1] Charles Rappleye, Robert Morris: Financier of the American Revolution, Simon and Schuster, 2010, Pg 291
[2] Ibid. Pg 343
[3] American Battlefield Trust, The Newburgh Conspiracy
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid.
Barry Singer
West Windsor, New Jersey. June, 2023
The author, a volunteer with the Historical Society of Princeton, is a speaker about the American Revolution and conducts walking tours in historic Princeton